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The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) was
signed into law in 1988, after five years of research
across Indian Country. Tribes began offering high
stakes bingo in the mid-1970s, as one component of
tribal economic development enterprises, and the rapid
rise in Indian bingo and other forms of gambling led
to creation of the IGRA. Many observers unfamiliar
with the complexities of tribal sovereignty—tribes’
inherent right to self-govern—believed that the IGRA
gave gaming to tribes. In fact, the IGRA was developed
in response to tribal gaming, and the policy reinforces
the inherent nature of tribal sovereignty as expressed
through tribes’ inherent rights to conduct gaming. The

IGRA created three regulatory classes and also a national
gaming commission, the National Indian Gaming
Commission (NIGC). Class I is defined as traditional
and ceremonial games, which do not require regulation.
Class II includes bingo and other similar games, which
are regulated by the tribe first and then the NGIC. Class
III is casino-style gambling and is regulated at the tribal,
state, and national levels.
Throughout the 1980s, state anxieties about Indian
casino gaming increased, and corporate casino owners
teamed with states and with religious groups to try to
stem the growth of Indian casino gaming. These tensions
resulted in a call to study gambling, which manifested
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in the National Gambling Impact Study Commission
(NGISC).1 Congress approved the Act (S 104-169) in
1996. The Act called for a comprehensive examination
of social and economic impacts of gambling, corporate
and state and tribal, across the United States, to
interrogate whether gambling was more positive or more
negative for the communities in which it was situated.2
It took Congress nearly two years to agree upon the
Commission’s goals, to determine who would serve on
the Commission and how members would be selected.
During those two years Congress consulted with
experts in corporate gaming and government gaming—
including tribal gaming—as well as gaming opponents
as it framed the work of the Commission. A previous
study had been conducted in 1976, and the NGISC was
charged with expanding upon that research.3 Legalized
gambling had exploded in the intervening twenty years.
In 1976, only two states had legalized gambling. In 1996
only four states did not have some form of gambling.4
Nine members served on the Commission, three
each appointed by the President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Majority Leader
of the Senate.5 Only one of these commissioners,
Robert Loescher (Tlingit), President of the Sealaska
Corporation, had any familiarity with tribal sovereignty
or tribal communities, and it is evident that Loescher
and Native American individuals who participated in
hearings before the Commission had a great deal of
education to perform in order to foster comprehension
of tribal sovereignty among the commissioners.6 In
addition to Loescher, the Commission included: James
Dobson president of the evangelical Focus on the Family
ministry; Kay James, dean of the School of Government
at Regent University; Paul Moore, M.D. of Mississippi,
a friend of Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott; William
Bible, chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control Board;
Richard Leone, president of the Twentieth Century
fund, a progressive think tank; Terrence Lanni, CEO
and Chairman of the Board of MGM Grand, Inc.; Leo
McCarthy, former lieutenant governor of California;
and John Wilhelm, secretary-treasurer of the Hotel
Employees and Restaurant Employees International
Union, a 40,000-member organization primarily serving
employees of Las Vegas hotels and casinos. Two of these
commissioners, Dobson and James, were staunchly and
publicly anti-gambling, and the corporate gambling
interests were anti-Indian gaming, at times viciously.
One appointee, Paul Moore, displayed no opinions or
prior knowledge of the gambling industry, and was
apparently recruited simply because of his friendship

with the Senate Majority Leader. Critics on both sides
of the gambling question charged the president and the
Congressional leaders with loading the commission
while advocates from both sides noted that impartial
conclusions would be impossible as a result.7
In April of 1998, Loescher recommended formation
of a subcommittee on Indian gaming. The complexities
of tribal law, tribal sovereignty, and Indian gaming were
far beyond the experience of the commissioners, and
Loescher asserted that the Commission would operate
more effectively if Indian gaming was a separate aspect
within the study. As a result of Loescher’s efforts, Indian
gaming was the only kind of gambling to have its own
subcommittee.8 The Subcommittee on Indian Gambling
was charged with examining “the impact of gambling
upon Native American governments, families and
communities.” Paul Moore, John Wilhelm, and Robert
Loescher served on this subcommittee, Moore as Chair,
and cultural anthropologist Katherine Spilde was hired
as a policy analyst for the subcommittee.9
The subcommittee essentially wanted to learn what
gaming had done for Indian Country and if the IGRA
was working. The group held hearings where tribal
leaders detailed the numerous positive impacts of Indian
casino gaming. The Shoshone Bannock tribe wanted the
subcommittee to know that “Gaming is the oldest form
of recreation: the Shoshone and Bannock peoples have
conducted traditional games since time immemorial.
Hand games and traditional card games still take place
on weekends at community lodges.”10 Harris Teo of
the Yakama Indian Nation observed, “Indian gaming
is governmental gaming…To paint a negative picture
of Indian gaming is another attempt to undermine
Indian self-determination and self-sufficiency.”11
Tribes consistently discussed tribal sovereignty, which
manifests as political sovereignty, cultural sovereignty,
and economic sovereignty.
When the NGISC began its research in 1996, Indian
casino gambling was entering its second decade. That
President Clinton included it as an area for research and
the Commission’s creation of a subcommittee to more
fully explore what Indian casino gambling meant for
Native American communities and the communities
around them is a testament both to the alreadysignificant economic revenues generated by Indian
gaming and to American anxieties about Indian gaming.
Moreover, tribes and the National Indian Gaming
Association (NIGA) played a central role in making
Indian gaming part of the larger study of gambling in
America. Timothy Wapato (Colville), former Executive
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Director of NIGA, reminded the Commission, “It was
Indian Nations who first proposed examination of the
relationship between gaming revenue and the [tribal
actions related to] poverty and welfare…and whether
other “alternative revenue systems” are available to
[tribal] governments. The final version of the legislation
created a Commission which was intended by Congress
to fairly and equitably examine Indian gaming in proper
relation to the more global issues the Commission was
created to examine.”12
More than one hundred tribal members from
50 gaming tribes13 testified before the subcommittee,
and the subcommittee consistently heard that Indian
gaming was working, and that the IGRA was working.
“Don’t destroy it;14 it means economic survival.”15
Mark Fox, on behalf of the North Dakota Indian
Gaming Association and the Three Affiliated Tribes
of the Fort Berthold Nation (Mandan, Hidatsa, and
Arikara Nation), discussed grave rates of poverty and
unemployment on the North Dakota reservations. He
noted that gaming had not wholly resolved these issues
but had improved employment and somewhat reduced
poverty.16 During another hearing, Clifton Pattea,
President of the Fort McDowell Mohave-Apache Indian
Community, reminded the subcommittee, “A few short
years of revenue cannot reverse years of poverty, despair,
and lack of quality education…[Our community] urges
the Commission to find that Indian Governmental
Gaming is positive and that it should be continued.”17
Cedro Gopsa of the Kickapoo Tribe of Texas
indicated that gaming would be the only way this
small and very poor tribe would begin to emerge from
poverty. The tribe had won federal recognition in 1983,
a long battle despite having a Peace Medal from George
Washington recognizing them as American allies, but
had no land base. The land base would provide homes
and community, yes, but Gopsa intentionally focused
the conversation on the inextricable connection
between Kickapoo spirituality and homeland. Without
a designated homeland, they had been prevented
from worship, blocked from practicing their ancestral
spiritualties. Gaming revenue would mean improved
social services and education, but more importantly it
represented the opportunity for cultural continuity.18 In
response to Gopsa, Moore proclaimed, “I got my wish. I
think we heard from some ‘po’ Indians.” Without irony
and barely pausing for breath after hearing from an
impoverished community, Moore then observed that
the Commission’s most serious charge was to determine
“how much is enough.” Throughout the day, Moore

asked each participant what they thought of the term
“rich Indian,” especially when he believed he had just
heard testimony from one. Then he was thrilled to at
last hear from “po’ Indians,” presumably because he
found them more legitimate or credible than tribes who
had won some economic successes through gambling.19
In fact, Moore misstated the Commission’s charge to
determine “how much is enough.” In the authorizing
legislation, Congress mandated the Commission
“conduct a comprehensive legal and factual study of the
social and economic impacts of gambling in the United
States on Federal, State, local, and Native American
tribal governments; and communities and social
institutions generally.” The Act called for a report which
summarized the research collected and which included
recommendations of the Commission, but it did not
authorize the Commission to limit growth of gaming or
to identify ways to limit growth of gaming. Individual
commissioners may have wanted to do so, but that was
outside their authority.20
Moore’s questions about rich Indians and poor Indians
illustrates American anxiety about whether Indians who
were not impoverished could still be Indian. As historian
Alexandra Harmon noted, “When it seemed that
Indians could also be millionaires, many people tried
to sort out their thoughts on ambition and on Indians
simultaneously.”21 The entire subcommittee process can
be viewed through this lens. Throughout the testimony
and the internal Commission meetings, Indian gaming
and issues of whether tribes “deserved” to have gaming
became a primary question for commissioners. They
were intensely interested in controlling tribes through
tighter regulations and through increased state and
federal control over decisions related to Indian gaming.
Whether or not commissioners favored or opposed
gambling, with the exception of Robert Loescher, all
of the commissioners believed tribes were somehow
gaining unfair advantages through gaming. Lou Jones,
head of security for the Viejas Tribe of California, a
native Californian but not a tribal member observed,
“I noticed you asked some questions earlier about
rich Indians, which I thought was rather interesting. I
have never heard anybody ask any business about rich
owners. It seems to me that sometimes in dealing with
Indians, if they are successful, we have a double standard
here, and this is what is happening in California.”22
Anthropologist Katherine Spilde noted that the
rhetoric of “rich Indians” has been used by outsiders to
“weaken tribal claims of sovereignty on the basis that
tribes do not need sovereign rights now that they have
3
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a new economic resource (emphasis in the original).”23
Tribes acknowledged recent economic successes
at the same time they asserted tribal sovereignty
and while reminding Commissioners about federal
commitments to tribes. Stanley Crooks, Chairman
of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Dakota community
asserted, “Gaming has brought substantial progress,
but it will be many years before the devastation of
nearly 200 years can be remedied, particularly for
larger tribes in rural areas…That is why I firmly
believe that the Federal Government must continue
to maintain its trust responsibility to the tribes,
irrespective of whether gaming continues or not. Our
Mdewakanton ancestors ceded 24 million acres of land
and gave up a way of life in exchange for the promise of
protection by the United States. That protection must
be honored.”24 All tribes noted the economic impact on
the reservations and surrounding communities, where
even low-revenue casinos put hundreds of thousands
of dollars into localities and states through goods
and services purchases and through payroll taxes and
charitable contributions. For higher revenue casinos,
these figures soared into the millions. Critics of Indian
gaming have noted that low-revenue casinos generate
little for their communities, but those conclusions
overlook the importance of tribal self-determination,
tribal economic development, and tribal member
pride in steady employment which feeds their families
and their intellect. Tribes do not view gaming as a
wealth generator, but instead as a mechanism which
supports the real wealth: community, culture, selfdetermination, and sovereignty. Put another way,
viewing Indian gaming simply through the lens of
economic development misses the point. And that’s
why it was so important for the subcommittee to hear
tribal testimony.
Stan Rice, Jr., President of the Yavapi-Prescott
Tribe, shared his community’s story, “Today, I come
before you to share a success story. A true story of selfsufficiency, growth, community involvement and, most
importantly, a story of pride…Once the recipient of
charity and governmental support, we are now giving
back to our community and supporting many of those
charitable groups which once helped us…In summary,
I pose the question, ‘What has gaming revenue done
for the Yavapi-Prescott Tribe?’ The answer is…fulfill a
dream. What we once thought was impossible has now
been made possible…Now we are in a position to realize
our dreams, to build a community, and to preserve our
heritage.”25

Hostilities
As tribal leaders shared meaningful accounts
of tribal restoration and noted some of the positive
social, cultural, and economic impacts gaming had on
their communities, subcommittee members seemed to
remain somewhat obtuse. As a result, tribal governments
and individuals testifying before the subcommittee
often felt they faced a hostile environment. Two issues
in particular emerged as points of contention during
the hearings: John Wilhelm’s conflict of interest and the
Commission’s insistent requests for casino-by-casino
tribal revenue data despite the NIGC’s response that the
data was legislatively deemed confidential by the IGRA.
John Wilhelm, on behalf of the HERE Union,
had brought five lawsuits and National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) proceedings against tribes. Jacob Coin,
Executive Director of NIGA, observed that Wilhelm
was “engaged in out-and-out warfare with Indian tribes,”
and that it “reflect[ed] poorly on the credibility of the
entire Commission for it not to insist that Mr. Wilhelm
remove himself from issues and reports involving Indian
gaming.”26 The day after the first Indian subcommittee
hearings in San Diego, the Coalition of Northern
California Tribes, via Priscilla Hunter (Chairperson,
Coyote Valley Tribe) and Victor Preston (Chairman,
Susanville Rancheria), wrote to Commission Chair Kay
James about Wilhelm’s behavior. Hunter and Preston
noted that the subcommittee told tribes seating was
limited to 20, so tribes should not bring employees
or tribal members. Upon arriving the first day, they
discovered the hearings were actually held in a large
room. On the second day, tribes arrived to find “the
entire ballroom filled to over capacity with Latino
people who were there in opposition to Proposition
5, [California’s] Indian Gaming Initiative. They were
wearing yellow union shirts and holding yellow “Vote
No on 5” placards.” Hunter and Preston went on to
say that tribal members who spoke Spanish asked the
protestors why they were at the hearing. “The Latino
people told the tribal members that they did not know
why they were there. They were just told to be there
and they would be paid. They were told to clap when
everyone else did. And they were told NOT to speak
with anyone (emphasis in the original).”
Despite these interruptions, tribes continued to
testify before the subcommittee, clearly recognizing that
they may have few chances to illustrate the impacts of
tribal gaming. Tribes initially felt the hearing went well,
until, “We were outraged when, at the conclusion of the
hearing and still within the ballroom, Commissioner
4

Arnold • Contextualizing Indian Gaming

John Wilhelm led an anti-Indian rally with the union
supporters, encouraging them to continue their fight
against Indian gaming. There is no doubt in our minds
that Commissioner Wilhelm has a severe conflict of
interest…Commissioner Wilhelm’s display is an insult
to the California Indian people. Did the Commission
invite tribes to a meeting to be publicly humiliated?”
Hunter and Preston concluded that tribes were
willing to share information and that they expected
to be treated with dignity and respect, and they also
requested that any future overt bias be eliminated from
the Commission.27 Wilhelm’s public anti-Indian bias
was not enough to remove him from the Commission;
he remained a member through the Commission’s end.
In addition to the conflict of interest inherent
in seating Wilhelm on the Commission, tribes also
had to repeatedly assert why the Commission was
not entitled to see confidential tribal casino revenue
and income statements. The IGRA expressly restricts
disclosure of tribal gaming information and it requires
the NIGC to keep all tribal information confidential.
Timothy Wapato (Colville), former Executive Director
of the National Indian Gaming Association, reminded
the Commission, “The authorizing Committees in
Congress (Senate Indian Affairs Committee and the
House Resources Committee) have done oversight or
examination on the effects of [the IGRA]…exceeding
a rate of three times a year. The idea behind this
Commission was not that Congress needed additional
information on Indian gaming from a national
Commission with limited experience in Indian Nation
matters.”28 Each of the one hundred people testifying
from their tribes addressed regulation in their
testimony, each one describing the three or four levels
of auditing and regulation their casinos employed,
and despite this, the Commission chose to impugn
tribes and sovereignty by concluding that tribes are
“unregulated,” the very conclusion tribes and NIGA
had feared from the beginning of the study. Keller
George, President of the United South and Eastern
Tribes and Chairman of the Oneida [New York]
Indian Gaming Commission posed this question
to the subcommittee in January 1998: “How do you
reconcile this overwhelming body of evidence with
the accusation that Indian gaming is unregulated?
The answer is quite simple—when you focus on
who is making the accusation. To the best of my
knowledge, no state government official has suggested
to the NGISC that the regulation of Indian gaming
is inadequate or that there is rampant corruption on

Indian reservations…Further, the federal government
has not appeared before this Commission to suggest
that organized crime has invaded Indian gaming…
The principle purveyors of the myth that Indian
gaming is unregulated are the owners and operators
of non-Indian casinos.” George observed that these
owners were simply afraid of competition and that
the motive for this misinformation was “a quest for
monopolistic power.” George went on to say that
outsiders who concluded that tribes were not capable
of self-regulation expressed sentiments that were at
best paternalistic, at worst racist. “In all events, these
attitudes will no longer be tolerated!”29
One leader lamented, “There is, in Indian Country,
a continuing fear of this Commission. There is concern
that this study will fail to report the facts despite the
many and historic efforts of Indian Nations to participate
openly and honestly. Events have occurred during the
life of this Commission which do not develop trust that
this Commission is interested in the facts about Indian
gaming.”30
Final Report
After a year of collecting testimony from tribes, the
subcommittee presented their findings to the whole
Commission. Robert Loescher reminded his fellow
commissioners that, per the IGRA, revenues from
Indian gaming must be used for the social and economic
impact of tribal members. “In my view, gaming is just a
tiny down payment on the deficit of stupendous social
and economic needs facing the vast majority of Native
American citizens. The Commission record strongly
supports the conclusion that the economic benefits
under IGRA are being realized.” 31
An early draft of the Indian Gambling Subcommittee
report concluded, “Tribal government gaming is
inherently problematic from a jurisdictional point of view
since Indian affairs are primarily a Federal concern and
gambling is historically a state one. Tribal government
gaming has intensified tensions over Federal, state, and
tribal jurisdiction that have existed for over 200 years.”32
After one year of tribal testimony regarding the positive
social, cultural, and economic impacts of tribal gaming,
and one year of extensive discussion of the IGRA, the
subcommittee chose to reinforce state anxieties over
tribal sovereignty rather than use its position to explain
tribal gaming more clearly. At the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs oversight hearing on Commission’s
final report, NIGA president Rick Hill (Oneida)
observed that the Commission could not understand
5
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tribes, “it was like Frankenstein meeting Dracula.” No
one on the Commission spoke the language necessary
to understand Indian-government gaming.33
Ultimately, the final Subcommittee on Indian
Gambling report did not include the draft language
and it was generally positive for tribes. It also changed
almost nothing. The Commission’s final report included
fifteen recommendations—the Commission had no
authority to implement recommendations or infringe
on tribal, federal, or state authority—ranging from
recognizing and protecting tribal sovereignty and state
sovereignty to acknowledging that the NIGC is the
lead federal regulator of Indian gaming and that tribes
must report annual gambling financial information to
the NIGC. The recommendations encouraged tribes,
states, and localities to continue to work together to find
mutually beneficial solutions for local infrastructure,
and that tribes and states should voluntarily work
together with unions to ensure workers’ rights. The
Commission observed that tribes and states should
work together, rather than expecting the federal law to
resolve issues, but at the same time, the Commission
called for Congress to specify “a constitutionally sound
means of resolving disputes between states and tribes
regarding Class III gaming.”34 At last, states and tribes
found common ground in their opposition to the
recommended Congressional solution for tribal-state
compacting. Tribes and states both asserted that such
legislation would diminish their respective sovereignties
and would eliminate the need to cooperate.35
Tribes had spent two years educating Commissioners
about tribal government gaming. Tribal leaders clearly
expressed how gaming had changed the lives of their
tribal members and how the economic impact of
gaming provided tribes with avenues to enhance
their political sovereignty and cultural sovereignty.
Joseph Kalt, from the Harvard Project on American
Indian Economic Development, told the Commission,
“Tribal gaming operations are the epitome of selfdetermination and self-government…They represent
acts of political will, expressed through tribal members’
own governments.” Viewed through the continuum of
federal Indian policy from separation to assimilation
to self-determination, tribal gaming unquestionably
illustrates how tribes implement their own solutions
how little tribes need a benevolent “Great Father.” It
is also important to reinforce that the NGISC report
did not change anything for Indian gaming because
tribal leaders participated in those conversations.
Unlike removal and allotment and termination, tribal

leaders defended tribal rights directly to the federal
officials trying to diminish those rights. Social activist
LaDonna Harris (Comanche) observed that tribes need
to institutionalize self-determination. “We know that
success depends on tribal leaders and Native activists
being at the table before—not after—major decisions
are made.”36 The success of Indian gaming was never
assured, a reality which is easy to forget forty years into
tribal gaming.37 The testimony of these tribal leaders not
only protected tribal government gaming for one more
day, it also advanced self-determination and reinforced
sovereignty.
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Center for American Indian and Indigenous Studies at
the Newberry Library in Chicago and at the University
of Notre Dame. Her first book, Bartering with the
Bones of Their Dead: The Colville Confederated Tribes
and Termination, was published by the University of
Washington Press in 2012. She holds a PhD in History
from Arizona State University and a Bachelor’s degree
in History from Oregon State University.
Professor Arnold’s next project, The National
Indian Gaming Association and Intertribal Activism:
Community Leaders, National Impacts, is a study of
Indian gaming told from the beginning, through the
lens of leaders who advocated on behalf of tribes and
who continue to advance tribal goals three decades
later. She developed the foundation for this project
during her time as an Eadington Fellow at the UNLV
Libraries in 2015.

In 2010, the Center for Gaming Research launched
an Occasional Paper Series that publishes brief studies
of gambling and casinos with a policy and publicinterest orientation.
These papers are generally between three and sixthousand words, written with the intent of informing
the public discussion of gambling and casinos. Topics
include gaming history, casino management, and
studies in sociology, economics, and political science
related to gambling.
Authors include faculty affiliated with the Center for
Gaming Research, particularly Eadington Fellows. As
part of their residency, fellows complete a paper for the
series.
In June 2013, the UNLV Gaming Press published
Frontiers in Chance: Gaming Research Across the
Disciplines, a collection of many of the papers in the
series. For more information about this book, please see
http://gamingpress.unlv.edu/.
A full set of the papers are available at: http://gaming.
unlv.edu/papers.html
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About the Center for Gaming Research
Founded in 1987, the Center for Gaming Research hosts scholars invesgiating a variety of subject areas. Located
within Special Collections at UNLV’s state-of-the-art Lied Library, its main resource is the Gamin Collection.
Many unique primary resources can be found only within the Collection. We preserve and make accessible
company documents, state publications, and other important resources.
The Center’s Eadington Fellow program, active since 2007, brings scholars from around the world to Las Vegas
to perform research in Special Collections. Fellows use the Center’s resources to further their study of gaming and
become ambassadors for the Center and UNLV.
The Center is committed to providing support for scholarly inquiry into all aspects of gaming. We serve as an
unparalleled resource for students, faculty, and independent scholars.
Students, faculty and community members interested in academically-oriented gaming research are welcome to
use the collection and the resources of the Center.
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